Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions' values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each time such a value is unknown and fluctuates within the bounded polyhedron. Then, it makes sense to define "robust" allocation rules, i.e., allocation rules that bound, within a predefined threshold, a so-called complaint vector while guaranteeing a certain average (over time) allocation vector. We also present as motivating example a joint replenishment application.
Introduction.
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables (see, e.g., [8, 9, 11, 12] . In this work we also consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances as in [1] . We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions' values and corresponds to a specific game. In doing this, we revisit the notion of the core with reference to a family of balanced games described in polyhedral form. Figure 1: Example of a one warehouse W and three retailers R 1 , R 2 and R 3 . R 1 faces a demand in the interval [0, 5] , R 2 in the interval [0, 10] , and R 3 in the interval [3, 8] .
2 Joint replenishment: motivation and polyhedral description.
Consider a single-period one-warehouse multi-retailer inventory system (see, e.g., [3, 5, 6] . [3, 8] . The retailers do not hold any private inventory, therefore to fulfill the demand, they must reorder from the central warehouse at a fixed transportation cost. Let this cost be K = 7 in the current example. The value of d i is known by retailer R i who selects his best decision regarding whether to reorder or not. In case of joint replenishment retailers are served by a single truck and share the transportation cost as established by the warehouse holder. The warehouse holder must in turn choose how to allocate costs among retailers based on the only knowledge of their demand intervals [d
. In other words, from the warehouse holder standpoint, demand d i is unknown but bounded. Also, the decision on cost allocation takes place before demand is realized. Because, after demand is realized, the retailers will place their orders or not and from this the warehouse may deduce information about the demand d i . We wish to find allocation rules that let all retailers benefit from joint replenishment at least on the long run.
We model the problem as a cooperative inventory game in coalitional form. In the example we have a set of three players N = {1, 2, 3}, namely the three retailers. If player i plays alone, the cost of reordering coincides with the full transportation cost (a single truck serves him alone) whereas the cost of not reordering is the cost of unfulfilled demand, that is, lost demand. Assume the latter cost is one unit per unit of unfulfilled demand.
To be more specific, for retailer R 1 in the example, the cost of reordering is K = 7 whereas the cost of not reordering varies in the bounded range [0, 5] . For R 1 the best decision is "no reordering" independently of the realization of d 1 and the associated cost c({1}) ∈ min{d − 1 , K}, min{d
For R 2 the best decision is "reordering" if d 2 is between 7 and 10 and "no reordering" if d 2 is between 0 and 7. In the first case he reorders and pays K, whereas in the second case he does not reorder and pays 7] . Note that for d 2 = 7 the incurred cost is 7 independently of the decision.
If two players form a coalition they are forced to select a joint decision ("both reorder" or "both do not reorder"). The cost of reordering for the coalition is still the total transportation cost which, this time, must be shared between the two players. The cost of not reordering is the sum of the unfulfilled demands of both players. For instance, the cost of coalition
In general, denote by R + the set of nonnegative reals and let d i ∈ R + be the unknown but bounded demand faced by retailer i and varying between d
. . , n} be the set of players and apply the same reasoning as above to compute the cost of all subcoalitions of N except for the empty set ∅. Henceforth, for the sake of notation, the inclusion S ⊆ N means "all subcoalitions of N except the empty set ∅". For any given coalition S ⊆ N it holds
Hence, the joint replenishment model results in a family of cost-games < N, C > where C is a polyhedron defined by
Observe that each point c ∈ C is a vector of coalitions' costs and corresponds to a specific cost-game. Given the cost of a coalition S as in (1), we can compute the cost savings v(S) of this coalition.
For example, the cost savings of coalition S = {1, 2} in the example are
It turns out that the cost savings, or value, of each coalition is bounded by a minimum and a maximum value, i.e., v min (S) ≤ v(S) ≤ v max (S) with fixed bounds v min (S) and v max (S). Thus, the family of cost games implies a family of cost-saving games < N, V > with polyhedron
and each value v(S) is computed according to (2) .
We are now in a position to show that the family of games (5) satisfies an interesting property. Namely, each vector v ∈ V corresponds to a balanced game, or in other words, (5) is a family of balanced games. For this, denote by 2 N the family of subsets of N . We recall the definition of a balanced map and a balanced game (see, e.g., [10, Def. 11.5] ).
Here, e S ∈ R n is the characteristic vector for coalition S with e S i = 1 if i ∈ S and e S i = 0 if i ∈ N \ S.
With the above definitions in mind, we can now prove that each point of the polyhedron (5) is corresponds to a balanced game. To do this, let S + a = {i ∈ S : d (4) can be rewritten as
These expressions are used to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
The polyhedron (5) describes a family of balanced games.
Proof We prove that condition (6) holds for v(S) as in (7)- (9). Observe that the latter equations include the generic term
Also note that condition (6) holds true if the above generic term satisfies
After manipulating the right-hand side, the above condition can be rewritten as
Now, observe that the first term in the left-hand side is equal to the first term in the righthand. Then it suffices to prove that
But this is easy to see, as the right-hand side can be rewritten as
where e N b is the characteristic vector of N b and e N T b is its transpose.
Let us generalize what we have done for the joint replenishment example and introduce a polyhedral description for addressing families of balanced games. The underlying idea is to use a polyhedron to describe the infinite set of admissible coalitions' values. The last part of this section addresses the notions of the core and an allocation rule. In doing so, we point out that any allocation rule in the core can be obtained by solving a set of linear equalitions.
Define a family of games < N, V > as the set of games < N, v > obtained when v varies within a polyhedron
where the bounds v min (S) and v max (S) are given. For sake of simplicity, throughout this paper we always assume v ≥ 0. Also, let n = |N |, where |X| is the cardinality of the set X, and let m = 2 n − 1. Define a family of balanced games < N, V b > as the set of games < N, v > obtained when v varies within a polyhedron
Now, let us revisit the notions of the core and an allocation rule for the above family of balanced games in polyhedral form. Indicate with ∆ n the simplex in R n and remind that a game is balanced if and only if the core is nonempty (see, e.g., [10, Theorem 11.7] ). By definition each game < N, v > with v ∈ V b is balanced, and so the core C(v),
is nonempty. This means that there exists an allocation a ∈ C(v) such that no coalition has an incentive to split off from the coalition N . Now, the idea is to find an allocation rule a(v) such that for all games v ∈ V b it holds that a(v) ∈ C(v). To do this, first observe that the core is a convex set described by linear equations and inequalities. For our purpose it is useful to change all inequalities into equations. To do this, we first introduce a vector of nonnegative surplus variables s = (s 1 , . . . , s m−1 ) T . Each surplus variable corresponds to a coalition of players and describes the difference between the allocated value and the coalitional value, i∈S a i −v(S). Notice that we only need m−1 surplus variables because i∈N a i = v(N ) due to the efficiency condition of the core. Further, we introduce an incidence matrix B ∈ R m×n with the characteristic vectors e S as rows, and an augmented matrix A ∈ R m×n+(m−1) defined by
where I is the (m − 1)-dimensional identity matrix. Finally, define a vector u ∈ R n+(m−1) , henceforth called allocation vector, by u = a s .
Now, for all v ∈ V b and for any vector a ∈ C(v), there is an allocation vector u ∈ R n+m−1 that satisfies the following set of linear equations
For instance, if n = 3 condition (11) becomes
Let U, be the set of solutions satisfying (11)- (12) and observe that, in general, U is a polyhedron of dimension n − 1. This means that finding an allocation vector in the core reduces to solving the set of equalities (11)- (12) for u. Notice that two different solutions of (11) describe different allocations of v(N ) among the players, which in turn means a higher satisfaction for those coalitions with larger surplus variables.
Dynamic system.
In this Section we consider a dynamic context where at each time the vector of coalitions' values fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. While such fluctuations are unknown, it is realistic to assume that we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run. The problem of interest, formulated at the end of this section, consists in finding "robust" allocation rules that bound a so-called complaint vector and guarantee a certain average allocation vector.
Consider, the dynamic system
in which the state variable x(k) describes the complaint levels of all subcoalitions at time k, i.e., the disagreement between the sum of the allocated revenues to the players of the coalitions, expressed by the product Au(k), and the vector of coalitions' values v(k). The condition u(k) ≥ 0 is omitted for sake of notation. More generally, system (13) also holds if the coalitions' values change slowly in comparison to the rate at which revenues are allocated.
In that case, it suffices to redefine the vector of coalitions' values by
where y is the greatest integer less than or equal to y and the sample interval Θ with 0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1 describes the length of the time interval between two successive allocations. A dynamic system of type (13) suggests the following interpretation (see, e.g., multi-inventory systems in [1] ): x(k) is a vector whose components are the buffer levels (each buffer level describes the level of complaint of a single coalition), u(k) is the controlled flow vector, A is the controlled process matrix, and v(k) is an (uncontrolled) exogenous input, typically modelling demand. Now, given a vector function y : R + −→ R m , we define the average of y bȳ
If we assume that one knows the average value of each coalition, the following lemma recalls a result obtained in [1] .
Lemma 2 (Average constraint) Consider an average vector of coalitions' valuesv and a pre-defined average allocation vectorū such that Aū =v.
There exists an allocation rule f : R m −→ R n+(m−1) such that for u(k) = f (v(k)), with v(k) as in (14),
and whenever the average coalitions' value tends tov, then the average allocation vector tends toū, if and only if there exists a matrix D ∈ R n+(m−1)×m that satisfies
The allocation rule is linear on v, that is
Observe that the linear allocation rule (17) requires perfect knowledge of the coalition values at each sample time. Differently, consider the case where revenues at time k must be allocated without a-priori knowledge of the coalitions' values v(k). We are interested in finding dynamic allocation rules that keep the complaint vector bounded within a prespecified threshold while satisfying the condition that if the average coalitions's value isv then the average allocation isū. For this we need the following definition, see [1] . For ξ ∈ R m , let ξ i denote the ith component of ξ, and define
Let Z denote the set of integers, and Z + the set of nonnegative integers. Let f = {f (0), f (1), f (2), . . .} be any bounded one-sided sequence in R m , and define
Our dynamic allocation rule is defined as follows.
Definition 3 Given ε > 0 and a reference valuex for system (13), an ε-stabilizing allocation rule is a feedback rule for which there exists a continuous positive function φ(k), monotonically decreasing and converging to 0 as k −→ ∞ such that for all x(0), the following condition holds true
The problem of interest can be stated as follows.
Problem 1
Given an average vector of coalitions' valuesv and a pre-defined average allocation vectorū such that Aū =v, find an ε-stabilizing allocation rule such that whenever the average coalitions' value tends tov then the average allocation vector tends toū.
In the next section we present a dynamic allocation rule that solves Problem 1.
Dynamic Allocation Rule.
The dynamic allocation rule that we propose as a solution to Problem 1 allocates the revenues according to the values assumed by an opportunely designed augmented state variable. Such a state variable models the complaint level of each coalition combined with the deviation of the instantaneous allocation from the pre-defined average allocation of each coalition. With the given augmented state variable Problem 1 reduces to simply finding an ε-stabilizing allocation rule for the augmented dynamic system. Actually, as it will be clearer later on, ε-stabilizing the augmented system implies both ε-stabilizing the complaint vector and meeting the average constraints.
From a standard property of linear algebra, see also the appendix, we can find two matrices C and F which "square" A and D and satisfy
Consider the following augmented system
where v(k) is as in (14). The additional dynamic variable y(k) keeps track of the deviation between the instantaneous and the average allocation of each player. Define the augmented state variable z ∈ R n+m−1 as
This variable satisfies the equation
This indicates that the allocation rule u(k) = −z(k), which is linear in z, solves the problem.
Theorem 1 Consider system (20) with v(k) as in (14). The allocation rule in feedback form
is such that the following condition on z holds true
and if the average coalitions' value isv then the average allocation vector isū.
Proof To prove (22) let us substitute the allocation rule (21) in the dynamics of (20). Then, we obtain z((k + 1)) = Dv(k) for all k, which implies (22). For the rest of the proof, by summing (20) for different k = 1, 2, . . ., we have that
as T → ∞ (actually the numerator is a finite quantity whereas the denominator tends to infinity). Thereforeū = Dv, which concludes the proof.
For fixed ε we wish to find the maximum time interval Θ * such that Dv(k) ≤ ε. Trivially, such a value is Θ * = ε δ where δ = max v∈V b |Dv|. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider system (20) with v(k) as in (14). For any ε and corresponding Θ * , if one chooses Θ ≤ min{Θ * , 1}, then the allocation rule in feedback form
is ε-stabilizing.
Proof It is easy to show that
Remark 1 A side effect of z ≤ ε is that also u ≤ ε as u = −z. This means that the smaller ε the smaller the maximum allocation (in magnitude).
Numerical example.
We return to the example in Section 2. In short, there is a set of retailers N = {1, 2, 3}, a transportation cost K = 7, minimum and maximum demands for each retailer 
and the associated family of cost-saving games is defined by Note that Aū =v. As for the threshold for the complaint vector we choose ε = 0.5 First we calculate D (details on how to formulate a linear programming problem to find D are in [1] ) and obtain 
Then we compute the matrices C and F that square B and D using the method explained in detail in appendix A. For the maximum sample time we get Θ * > 0.1 and choose Θ = 0.1. It is left to implement the dynamic allocation rule (23) in feedback form to simulate the evolution of the augmented state variable z(.). 6 The Shapley value as linear allocation rule.
In this Section we study the Shapley value as a special linear allocation rule of the form (17). In particular, we show that there is a matrix Φ that satisfies (15).
The Shapley value φ, which is defined in [7] , equals φ = Theorem 2 The Shapley value φ is linear on v, i.e.,
where the matrix L ∈ R n×m is defined by
if column j corresponds to coalition S with s = |S|.
Proof The proof follows immediately from the definition of the Shapley value in [7] . 
Let s(φ) be the vector of surplus variables when revenues are allocated according to the Shapley value φ. The idea is now to express s(φ) linearly in v.
Theorem 3 The vector of surplus variables is linear on v, i.e.,
where Q ∈ R m−1×m has row i associated to a surplus variable (a subcoalition S ⊂ N ), column j associated to a subcoalition M ⊆ N , and generic ijth element
Proof First, consider the coalition of only player 1 and let L i• be the generic ith row of L.
The associated surplus variable is
The latter equation yields
, which is in according with (28). If we repeat the same reasoning for a generic subcoalition M ⊂ N , the surplus variable is
Remind j is the column associated to coalition M . Then, the latter equation yields Q jk = i∈M L ik if k = j and Q jj = i∈M L ij − 1 which is in accordance with (28).
An example of matrix Q for the case n = 3, is the following one (see, e.g., matrix L in (26) for the case n = 3)
Using the fact that φ and s(φ) are linear functions of v, we define the allocation vector associated to the Shapley value by
.
Corollary 2 There exists a matrix
Furthermore Φ is a pseudo inverse of A, i.e.,
Proof For the first part, from Theorem 2 and 3 we have
which finishes this part.
Let us now prove that AΦ = I. It suffices to show that A i• Φ •j = 1 if i = j and zero otherwise. By observing that the generic row i of A, denoted by A i• ∈ R 1×n+(m−1) , is associated to a generic subcoalition M ⊆ N , whereas the generic column j of Φ, denoted Φ •j ∈ R n+(m−1)×1 , is associated to a generic subcoalition S ⊆ N , the condition i = j corresponds to M = S.
Returning to A i• , it has the first n elements associated to players p = 1 . . . n, and the last m − 1 elements associated to all subcoalitions R ⊂ N (recall the structure of A described in (10)). Using index p to scan all players and R to scan all subcoalitions, we can sketch its structure as follows
Analogously, Φ •j has the first n elements associated to players p = 1 . . . n, and the last m − 1 elements associated to all subcoalitions R ⊂ N (remind the structure of Q and L from (25) and (28)). Now, keeping in mind the structures of A i• in (31), if i = j, namely, M = S we have
On the contrary if i = j, namely, M = S, we have 
Conclusions.
Inspired by a joint replenishment application, we have considered a dynamic cooperative game where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each time such a value is unknown and fluctuates within a bounded polyhedron. In this context, we have presented a constructive method to find "robust" allocation rules, i.e., allocation rules that bound, within a pre-defined threshold, a so-called complaint vector while guaranteeing a certain average allocation vector.
A Computation of C and F . 
Let us now rewrite the matrices A, C, D and F as follows.
• A = [ A 0 A 1 ] where A 0 is a m × r − m matrix and A 1 is an m × m non singular matrix.
• C = [ C 0 C 1 ] where C 0 is a r − m × r − m matrix and C 1 is an r − m × m matrix.
• D = D 0 D 1 where D 0 is an r − m × m matrix and D 1 is an m × m non singular matrix.
• F = F 0 F 1 where F 0 is a r − m × r − m matrix and F 1 is an m × r − m matrix. Now, we derive the following relationships among the different components of the above matrices:
• from (33), we obtain A 1 F 1 = −A 0 F 0 . Whence 
